A new look for Stackelberg-Cournot equilibria in oligopolistic markets

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2002
Volume: 20
Issue: 1
Pages: 183-188

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This note deals with Cournot type oligopolies in which the market clearing price occasionally may be non-unique. A Stackelberg leading producer is present. Given that setting we explore continuity properties of the followers' reaction and provide sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:20:y:2002:i:1:p:183-188
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25