RISK AVERSION AND OVERBIDDING IN FIRST PRICE SEALED BID AUCTIONS: NEW EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

C-Tier
Journal: Economic Inquiry
Year: 2019
Volume: 57
Issue: 1
Pages: 631-647

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Bidding above the risk‐neutral Nash equilibrium in first price sealed bid auctions has traditionally been ascribed to risk aversion. Later studies, however, offer other explanations and even argue that risk aversion plays no or a minor role. In a novel experimental design, we directly test the relationship between risk aversion and overbidding by systematically varying the distribution of risk attitudes in auction markets. We find a significant relationship between our measure of risk aversion and overbidding. (JEL D44, C91)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:ecinqu:v:57:y:2019:i:1:p:631-647
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25