Underpricing of initial public offerings in experimental asset markets

A-Tier
Journal: Experimental Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 23
Issue: 4
Pages: 1002-1029

Authors (3)

Sascha Füllbrunn (Max-Planck-Gesellschaft) Tibor Neugebauer (not in RePEc) Andreas Nicklisch (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPO) is a well-documented fact of empirical equity market research. Theories explain this underpricing with market imperfections. We study three empirically relevant IPO mechanisms under almost perfect market conditions in the laboratory: a stylized book building approach, a closed book auction, and an open book auction. We report underpricing in each of these IPO mechanisms. Uncertainty about the aftermarket behavior may partly explain IPO excess returns but underpricing persists even in the repeated setting where uncertainty is negligible and despite the equilibrium adjustment dynamics, that we observe in the data. The data reveal a market-wide impact of investors’ reluctance to sell in the aftermarket at a price below the offering price. We conclude that a behavioural bias similar to the disposition effect fosters IPO underpricing in our setting.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:expeco:v:23:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-019-09638-7
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25