The Stakeholder Corporation and Social Welfare

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2023
Volume: 131
Issue: 9
Pages: 2556 - 2594

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The stakeholder (or responsible) firm maximizes the (weighted or unweighted) sum of the surpluses of its customers and suppliers (including workers). Although this objective is hard to empirically measure, it can be pursued by simple management rules that rely on constrained profit maximization. Unconstrained profit maximization gives a competitive edge to ordinary firms, but stakeholder firms are better for social welfare and internalize several important effects of their activities on society. Long-term entry decisions should rely on profit modified by Pigouvian pricing of externalities, and this result provides a novel justification for the polluter-pays principle.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/724318
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25