Toxic Arbitrage

A-Tier
Journal: The Review of Financial Studies
Year: 2017
Volume: 30
Issue: 4
Pages: 1053-1094

Authors (3)

Thierry Foucault (HEC Paris (École des Hautes Ét...) Roman Kozhan (not in RePEc) Wing Wah Tham (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Short-lived arbitrage opportunities arise when prices adjust with a lag to new information. They are toxic because they expose dealers to the risk of trading at stale quotes. Hence, theory implies that more frequent toxic arbitrage opportunities and faster responses to these opportunities should impair liquidity. We provide supporting evidence using data on triangular arbitrage. As predicted, illiquidity is higher on days when the fraction of toxic arbitrage opportunities and arbitrageurs’ relative speed are higher. Overall, our findings suggest that the price efficiency gain of high-frequency arbitrage comes at the cost of increased adverse selection risk.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:rfinst:v:30:y:2017:i:4:p:1053-1094.
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25