Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2018
Volume: 126
Issue: 4
Pages: 1339 - 1373

Authors (3)

Jeremy T. Fox (Rice University) Chenyu Yang (not in RePEc) David H. Hsu (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Agents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. In full generality, we consider many-to-many matching and matching with trades. The distribution of match-specific unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities, can be identified. Using data on unmatched agents restores identification.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/697740
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25