Asymmetric Information, Market Power, and the Underpricing of New Stock Issues in Germany, 1882–1892

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic History
Year: 2010
Volume: 70
Issue: 3
Pages: 630-656

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Investors in new stock issues in Germany in the 1880s experienced low spreads between the price they paid for stock and the price at which they could sell the stock in the market. Stock issuing companies paid substantial fees to underwriting banks, and these costs increased with the underwriter's market share. Bank's faced lower issuing costs than did nonfinancial firms. These patterns are consistent with a situation in which underwriters exploited their access to better information (agency problems) and had market power, but do not support the supposed lemons problems that motivated the imposition of stringent regulations in 1896.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jechis:v:70:y:2010:i:03:p:630-656_00
Journal Field
Economic History
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25