Learning through Simultaneous Play: Evidence from Penny Auctions

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2016
Volume: 25
Issue: 4
Pages: 1040-1059

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper contributes to the emerging empirical literature on penny auctions, a particular type of all‐pay auctions. We focus on the potential learning effects that bidders may experience over time but also (and particularly) across auctions as a result of their auction participation. Using detailed bid‐level information, we find that, similarly to earlier literature, bidders suffer from a sunk cost fallacy, whereby their probability of dropping out of an auction is decreasing in the number of bids they have already placed in that auction. Although we do find that learning through repeated participation alleviates the sunk cost fallacy, participation in simultaneous penny auctions emerges as a much more effective learning mechanism, ultimately contributing toward bidders earning higher individual surpluses.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:25:y:2016:i:4:p:1040-1059
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25