Preordered service in contract enforcement

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2020
Volume: 122
Issue: C
Pages: 130-149

Authors (2)

Auerbach, Jan U. (not in RePEc) Fonseca, Miguel A. (University of Exeter)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

To address delay and backlog at civil courts, we propose a procedural rule that we refer to as preordered service to replace sequential service of low-profile cases for breach of contract. Courts preannounce a list that uses uniquely identifying information to rank potential low-profile contracts, like a combination of contracting parties' taxpayer numbers. They use this list to schedule initial hearings of filed low-profile contract cases in that order. In theory, unlike sequential service, preordered service ensures efficiency in a population of investment games through unraveling. Results from a laboratory experiment suggest that it may substantially reduce court caseloads.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:122:y:2020:i:c:p:130-149
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25