Reciprocal Dumping with Product Differentiation*

B-Tier
Journal: Review of International Economics
Year: 2008
Volume: 16
Issue: 5
Pages: 942-954

Authors (2)

Richard Friberg (Stockholm School of Economics) Mattias Ganslandt (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper examines if international trade can reduce total welfare in an international oligopoly with differentiated goods. We show that intra‐industry trade, i.e. “reciprocal dumping,” can result in lower total surplus than autarky in a Cournot model for any degree of product differentiation. Moreover, trade can reduce welfare compared to autarky in a Bertrand model when the local markets are sufficiently competitive and products are sufficiently close substitutes. Otherwise it unambiguously increases welfare.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:reviec:v:16:y:2008:i:5:p:942-954
Journal Field
International
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25