Monopolistic Competition, Risk Aversion, and Equilibrium Recessions

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1990
Volume: 105
Issue: 4
Pages: 921-938

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper considers a model with monopolistic competition and multiple equilibria, rankable by output, employment, and the Pareto criterion. While papers in the literature assume a linear production technology and derive a continuum of equilibria, we assume a standard diminishing returns production function and find a finite set of equilibria. Our new feature is the assumption that firms behave in a risk-averse manner. A low-level equilibrium is sustainable because firms, at the low profits level associated with the equilibrium, become extremely cautious in their employment decisions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:4:p:921-938.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25