Decision-making in competitive framings—Strategic behavior of chess players in mini-ultimatum game chess puzzles

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 115
Issue: 3
Pages: 356-358

Authors (4)

Bühren, Christoph (not in RePEc) Frank, Björn (Universität Kassel) Krabel, Stefan (not in RePEc) Werner, Alexander (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.251 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We introduce a competitive framing in the mini-ultimatum game utilizing chess puzzles. Therein, our chess playing participants accept low offers significantly more often compared to a neutral framing. We conclude that in familiar competitive surroundings egoistic behavior is more acceptable.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:356-358
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25