DISSECTING THE MONTY HALL ANOMALY

C-Tier
Journal: Economic Inquiry
Year: 2018
Volume: 56
Issue: 3
Pages: 1817-1826

Authors (4)

Duncan James (not in RePEc) Daniel Friedman (University of Essex) Christina Louie (not in RePEc) Taylor O'Meara (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.251 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We assess competing explanations of irrational behavior in the Monty Hall problem by creating new variants of the problem. Some variants employ a feature that automates the merging of probabilities, thus rendering transparent the probabilistic advantage of the rational choice. That feature also enables systematic variation in informational asymmetry, and in ordering of actions. Data from 77 subjects, each of whom makes 30 binary decisions, indicate that automated merging raises the fraction of rational choices from around 40% to over 80%. Other features examined have much less impact, indicating the importance of a Bayesian updating failure. (JEL C91, D02, D81, D83)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:ecinqu:v:56:y:2018:i:3:p:1817-1826
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25