On the role of patience in collusive Bertrand duopolies

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2008
Volume: 100
Issue: 1
Pages: 60-63

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper analyzes the role of patience in a repeated Bertrand duopoly where firms bargain over which collusive price and market share to implement. It is shown that the least patient firm's market share is not monotone in its own discount factor.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:1:p:60-63
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24