Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games

C-Tier

Journal: Economics Letters

Year: 2010

Volume: 108

Issue: 1

Pages: 16-18

Authors (6)

Andersson, Ola (Uppsala Universitet) Galizzi, Matteo M. (London School of Economics (LS...) Hoppe, Tim (not in RePEc) Kranz, Sebastian (Universität Ulm) der Wiel, Karen van (not in RePEc) Wengström, Erik (Lunds Universitet)

Score contribution per author:

0.168 = (α=2.01 / 6 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.

Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games

Authors (6)

Abstract

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