Covenants not to Compete, Labor Mobility, and Industry Dynamics

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2008
Volume: 17
Issue: 3
Pages: 581-606

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Conventional wisdom among legal scholars is that contractual restrictions on employee mobility affect turnover and led to the overtaking of Massachusetts' Route 128 by Silicon Valley. We study a model of employee mobility in the spirit of Pakes and Nitzan to see when this can be the case. We show that, in fact, with certain frictions taken into account, a model of employee mobility can not only replicate the overtaking by Silicon Valley, but it can also help to explain Route 128s early dominance. Further, the model explains the relative success of firms that start as, or generate, spin‐outs.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:17:y:2008:i:3:p:581-606
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25