Economics at the FTC: Cases and Research, with a Focus on Petroleum

B-Tier
Journal: Review of Industrial Organization
Year: 2005
Volume: 27
Issue: 3
Pages: 223-252

Authors (5)

Luke Froeb (Vanderbilt University) James Cooper (not in RePEc) Mark Frankena (not in RePEc) Paul Pautler (not in RePEc) Louis Silvia (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.402 = (α=2.01 / 5 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Economics at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) covers both the antitrust and consumer protection missions. In this year’s essay, we focus mainly on the competition-side of the agency. Drawing on a wealth of recent research, we provide descriptive and analytical information about the petroleum industry. Mergers, as always, were a major preoccupation of the FTC, and we discuss a few oil industry mergers as well as one leading litigated case – Arch Coal’s acquisition of Triton Coal. Finally, we review the empirical literature on the effects of vertical restraints, noting that the literature supporting an animus toward such restraints is surprisingly weak. Copyright Springer 2005

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:revind:v:27:y:2005:i:3:p:223-252
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
5
Added to Database
2026-01-25