Politicians: be killed or survive

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2013
Volume: 156
Issue: 1
Pages: 357-386

Authors (2)

Benno Torgler (not in RePEc) Bruno Frey (Universität Basel)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. To investigate this phenomenon, rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using a large data set covering close to 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well-functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and a stronger civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:156:y:2013:i:1:p:357-386
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25