An evolutionary theory of monogamy

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2016
Volume: 166
Issue: C
Pages: 605-628

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper presents a non-cooperative evolutionary model to explain the widespread diffusion of lifelong monogamous families. The essential condition, unique to humans, is the overlap of children of different ages. Under this condition, together with the salience of paternal investment and fatherhood uncertainty, monogamy attains a greater survivorship than serial monogamy and polygyny. This result is robust to a number of extensions, including the presence of kin ties, resource inequality, group marriage, and the risk of adult mortality.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:166:y:2016:i:c:p:605-628
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25