Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2008
Volume: 100
Issue: 1
Pages: 91-95

Authors (2)

Fujinaka, Yuji (Kansai University) Wakayama, Takuma (Ryukoku University)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

This paper studies secure implementation [Saijo, T., Sjöström, T., Yamato, T., 2007. Secure implementation. Theoretical Economics 2, 203-229] in economies with indivisible objects and money. We establish that on any minimally rich domain that is proposed in our paper, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:1:p:91-95
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25