Elimination of Social Security in a Dynastic Framework

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2007
Volume: 74
Issue: 1
Pages: 113-145

Authors (3)

Luisa Fuster (Universidad Carlos III de Madr...) Ayşe İmrohoroğlu (not in RePEc) Selahattin İmrohoroğlu (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Much of the existing literature on social security has taken the extreme assumption that individuals have little or no altruism; this paper takes an opposite assumption that there is full two-sided altruism. When households insure members that belong to the same family line, privatizing social security can gain public support. In our benchmark model calibrated to the U.S. economy, privatization without compensation is favoured by 52% of the population. If social security participants are fully compensated for their contributions, and the transition to privatization is financed by a combination of debt and a consumption tax, 58% experience a welfare gain. These gains and the resulting public support for social security reform depend critically on a flexible labour market. If the labour supply elasticity is low, then support for privatization disappears. Copyright 2007, Wiley-Blackwell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:74:y:2007:i:1:p:113-145
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25