Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2020
Volume: 121
Issue: C
Pages: 169-189

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper formalizes common belief among players with no underlying assumption on their individual beliefs. Especially, players may not be logically omniscient, i.e., they may not believe logical consequences of their beliefs. The key idea is to use a novel concept of a common basis: it is an event such that, whenever it is true, every player believes its logical consequences. The common belief in an event obtains when a common basis implies the mutual belief in that event. If players' beliefs are assumed to be true, then common belief reduces to common knowledge. The formalization nests previous axiomatizations of common belief and common knowledge which have assumed players' logical monotonic reasoning. Under this formalization, unlike others, if players have common belief in rationality then their actions survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions even if their beliefs are not monotonic.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:121:y:2020:i:c:p:169-189
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25