On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2019
Volume: 174
Issue: C
Pages: 22-25

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We explore how outcomes of optimal monetary policy with loose commitment (Schaumburg and Tambalotti, 2007; Debortoli and Nunes, 2010) with the non-reoptimization probability of α can be interpretable as outcomes of deeper optimal policy under sustainable plans (Chari and Kehoe, 1990) with N-period punishment. In a standard monetary-policy framework, we show that, for any sufficiently high value of α, there exists an integer N such that impulse responses to the cost-push shock under each policy are similar to each other.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:174:y:2019:i:c:p:22-25
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25