Subjective Evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2015
Volume: 7
Issue: 1
Pages: 99-108

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide a new rationale for the use of discretionary bonuses. In a setting with unknown match qualities between a worker and a firm and subjective evaluations by the principal, bonuses are useful in order to make the feedback from the firm to the workers credible. This way workers in good matches are less inclined to accept outside offers. (JEL D82, J33, M12, M52)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:1:p:99-108
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25