Venture‐Capital Syndication: Improved Venture Selection vs. The Value‐Added Hypothesis

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2002
Volume: 11
Issue: 3
Pages: 423-452

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Syndication arises when venture capitalists jointly invest in projects. We model and test two possible reasons for syndication: project selection, as an additional venture capitalist provides an informative second opinion; and complementary management skills of additional venture capitalists. The central question is whether venture capitalists are engaged primarily in selection or in managerial value added. These alternatives imply contrasting predictions about comparative returns to syndicated and standalone investments. Our empirical analysis, using Canadian data, finds that syndicated investments have higher returns, favoring the value‐added interpretation. We also discuss risk sharing and project scale as possible reasons for syndication.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:11:y:2002:i:3:p:423-452
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24