Electoral economics: Maximizing local representation under proportionality

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2019
Volume: 182
Issue: C
Pages: 109-113

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Electoral systems struggle to combine proportionality (fair representation) and direct accountability (local representation). Economic optimization tools can be used to devise an improvement to conventional forms of proportional representation. Single or dual optimal assignment of constituencies can provide better local representation by maximizing the number of voters who are represented directly.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:182:y:2019:i:c:p:109-113
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24