Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 1997
Volume: 6
Issue: 1
Pages: 235-256

Authors (1)

Esther Gal‐Or (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper surveys recent work in contract theory that relates to the allocation of tasks among agents within an organization as well as to the effect of product market competition upon optimal contracting and agency costs.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:6:y:1997:i:1:p:235-256
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25