Exit, sunk costs and the selection of firms

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 1999
Volume: 13
Issue: 3
Pages: 643-670

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper aims to identify the cost characteristics of exiting firms whenever firms are playing an infinite horizon supergame with time-invariant cost and demand functions. With more than two firms, the problem of which firms exit is quite similar to a coalition formation one. Solving this coalition formation problem, we obtain that the exiting firms are those with higher average cost functions whenever reentry is costless while, whenever reentry is unprofitable, the exiting firms are those with lower marginal (and possibly average) cost functions. Since reentry costs are typically sunk, our analysis points out that the presence of sunk costs affects not only the size (as it is well known) but also the composition of the industry.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:13:y:1999:i:3:p:643-670
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25