Endogenous property rights regimes, common-pool resources and trade

B-Tier
Journal: Ecological Economics
Year: 2011
Volume: 70
Issue: 5
Pages: 951-962

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A model is developed where opening to trade affects a dynamic common-pool resource stock and welfare through a community's voting decision to institute a property rights regime regulating the stock. The model finds that resource stock levels can decline even when a Markov perfect equilibrium path for labor and property rights regimes are chosen to maximize welfare. Thus, opening to trade can be welfare maximizing even when resource stock declines. Experimental results show that under certain conditions, subjects briefly follow a Markov perfect equilibrium path for property rights regime choice but labor allocations are myopically chosen indicating that some resource dynamics may be considered by subjects.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolec:v:70:y:2011:i:5:p:951-962
Journal Field
Environment
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25