The Economics of Roscas and Intrahousehold Resource Allocation

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 2002
Volume: 117
Issue: 3
Pages: 963-995

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas). Detailed evidence from roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women, particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income. We propose an explanation of this based on conflictual interactions within the household. Participation in a rosea is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption. The empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in Kenya.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:117:y:2002:i:3:p:963-995.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24