Separability and public finance

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2009
Volume: 93
Issue: 11-12
Pages: 1168-1174

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a second best environment, the optimal policy choice sometimes follows first best rules. This paper presents a formal general argument which allows to unify much of the literature. It lays down the information structure and separability assumptions under which the results hold in a variety of setups, with extensions to preference heterogeneity and individual production sets.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:93:y:2009:i:11-12:p:1168-1174
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25