Eductive learning and the rationalizability of oligopoly games

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2013
Volume: 120
Issue: 3
Pages: 401-404

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper extends the eductive learning approach in settings with non-atomistic agents. It shows the connection between the characterization of rationalizable sets by Basu (1991) and the seminal result by Guesnerie (1992) in the context of Cournot oligopoly models.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:3:p:401-404
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25