Governance through Trading: Institutional Swing Trades and Subsequent Firm Performance

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 2013
Volume: 48
Issue: 2
Pages: 427-458

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using unique daily fund-manager trade data, we examine the role of institutional trading in influencing firm performance. We show that short-horizon informed trading by multiple institutional investors effectively disciplines corporate management. Our focus is on short-term “swing” trades, sequences with three phases (e.g., buy-sell-buy). We find swing trades increase stock price informativeness, are profitable after costs, and improve market efficiency. This increase in stock price informativeness is associated with subsequent firm outperformance. Trades are most beneficial with optimal stock holdings that reflect the information acquisition incentives of investors as well as liquidity costs.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:48:y:2013:i:02:p:427-458_00
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25