Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results From Old Methods

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 1991
Volume: 58
Issue: 2
Pages: 399-404

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique Cournot equilibrium. Previous uniqueness results have depended on an assumption of non-degeneracy of equilibrium. As we illustrate, this assumption often fails in multi-stage games with proper Cournot subgames. Since our uniqueness results do not depend on this assumption, they are more widely applicable.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:58:y:1991:i:2:p:399-404.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25