Layoff taxes and minimum wage: Two complementary public policies

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2010
Volume: 107
Issue: 1
Pages: 30-32

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a matching model in which the job destruction rate and the output are endogenous, we show that the presence of a binding minimum wage prompts firms to choose too risky jobs. Introducing layoff taxes therefore reduces unemployment and improves market efficiency.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:1:p:30-32
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25