Run-off Elections in the Laboratory

A-Tier
Journal: Economic Journal
Year: 2022
Volume: 132
Issue: 641
Pages: 106-146

Authors (4)

Laurent Bouton (not in RePEc) Jorge Gallego (Inter-American Development Ban...) Aniol Llorente-Saguer (not in RePEc) Rebecca Morton

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study experimentally the properties of the majority run-off system and compare them to those of plurality rule. Our focus is on Duverger’s famous prediction that the plurality rule leads to higher co-ordination of votes on a limited number of candidates than the majority run-off rule. We find strong co-ordination forces under both systems. However, as predicted by the theory, in some cases these forces are stronger under plurality. Despite these differences in voting behaviour, we find small and mostly not significant differences in electoral outcomes and, hence, voters’ welfare.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:econjl:v:132:y:2022:i:641:p:106-146.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25