Knowledge Transfer, Transitional Dynamics and Optimal Research & Development Policy in a Dynamic Monopoly Setting

B-Tier
Journal: Review of Industrial Organization
Year: 2020
Volume: 57
Issue: 3
Pages: 579-606

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract This paper focuses on the question of whether or not a reduction of the knowledge barrier is good for welfare. Based on a dynamic monopoly setting with simultaneous investment decisions in process as well as in product Research & Development (R&D), we show that a reduction of the knowledge barrier has ambiguous welfare consequences: due to a lower knowledge barrier, product quality and welfare increase in the short-run. However, this may not necessarily be the case in the long-run. One reason is that a positive long-lasting knowledge barrier shock triggers the monopolist sub-optimally to reduce its product R&D investments today and in the future at the cost of future product quality. This in turn may reduce welfare. Accordingly, to realize the first-best level of product quality, the long-run optimal R&D subsidy rate for product innovations increases with a reduction of the knowledge barrier.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:revind:v:57:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11151-020-09779-7
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24