Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2016
Volume: 106
Issue: 11
Pages: 3275-99

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the profit-maximizing price path of a monopolist selling a durable good to buyers who arrive over time and whose values for the good evolve stochastically. The setting is completely stationary with an infinite horizon. Contrary to the case with constant values, optimal prices fluctuate with time. We argue that consumers' randomly changing values offer an explanation for temporary price reductions that are often observed in practice.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:11:p:3275-99
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25