Identifying voter preferences: The trade-off between honesty and competence

B-Tier
Journal: European Economic Review
Year: 2018
Volume: 105
Issue: C
Pages: 27-50

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We set up two experiments to measure how voters trade off the competence and honesty of candidates in elections. We measure the competence and honesty of candidates by asking them to work on a real effort task and decide whether to report truthfully or not the value of their work. In the first stage, the earnings are the result of the competence and honesty of one randomly selected participant. In the second stage, subjects can select who will determine their earnings based on the first stage's competence and honesty of the alternative candidates. We find that most voters tend to have a bias towards caring about honesty even when this results in lower payoffs.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eecrev:v:105:y:2018:i:c:p:27-50
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25