Motivated information acquisition and social norm formation

B-Tier
Journal: European Economic Review
Year: 2024
Volume: 167
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Dimant, Eugen (not in RePEc) Galeotti, Fabio (Université de Lyon) Villeval, Marie Claire (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We investigate how individuals select sources of information about peers’ behavior and normative views, and the influence of this social information on individual behavior and both empirical and normative expectations. This is explored through two experiments (N=1,945; N=2,414) using a lying game, with and without known political identification. Our findings reveal a self-serving bias in the selection of information sources, with a preference for lenient sources (i.e., those presenting more tolerant empirical or normative information about lying), particularly when these sources align with an individual’s political identity. We observe that being exposed to information that suggests lying is more socially acceptable increases lying behavior. Additionally, while people’s normative expectations are not swayed by observing their peers’ actions, these expectations are influenced by information about what peers believe is the right thing to do, underscoring the role of normative information in shaping social norms.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eecrev:v:167:y:2024:i:c:s0014292124001077
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25