Monotone comparative statics in games with non-monotonic best-replies: Contests and Cournot oligopoly

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2019
Volume: 183
Issue: C
Pages: 823-841

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In this paper, we employ lattice-theoretic techniques to derive a number of comparative statics in a logit contest – a class of games for which best-replies are generically non-monotonic. Using the same approach, we obtain several comparative statics in a Cournot oligopoly model without imposing the usual assumptions that ensure the game is one of strategic substitutes. Our analysis illustrates how lattice-theoretic techniques can deliver powerful insights in games with non-monotonic best-replies.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:183:y:2019:i:c:p:823-841
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25