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α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
A salient feature of over-the-counter (OTC) markets is intermediation: dealers buy from and sell to customers as well as other dealers. Traditionally, the search-theoretic literature of OTC markets has rationalized this as a consequence of random meetings and ex post bargaining between investors. We show that neither of these are necessary conditions for intermediation. We build a model of a fully decentralized OTC market in which search is directed and sellers post prices ex ante. Intermediation arises naturally as an equilibrium outcome for a broad class of matching functions commonly used in the literature. We further explore, both analytically and numerically, how the extent of intermediation depends on the nature of frictions and model primitives. Our numerical exercises also contrast the model's equilibrium implications to those of a benchmark model with random meetings and ex post bargaining.