One-sided commitment in life insurance contracts: Evidence from Health and Retirement Study

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2022
Volume: 219
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Wu, Xi (not in RePEc) Gan, Li (Texas A&M University)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the properties of long-term insurance contracts using an individual-level survey data. Results indicate longer-term contracts are involved with lower lapse rates and healthier pool. These are consistent with the implications of Hendel and Lizzeri model with one-sided commitment.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:219:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522003081
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25