Financial crises, bank risk exposure and government financial policy

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics
Year: 2012
Volume: 59
Issue: S
Pages: S17-S34

Authors (3)

Gertler, Mark (New York University (NYU)) Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro (not in RePEc) Queralto, Albert (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A macroeconomic model with financial intermediation is developed in which the intermediaries (banks) can issue outside equity as well as short term debt. This makes bank risk exposure an endogenous choice. The goal is to have a model that can not only capture a crisis when banks are highly vulnerable to risk, but can also account for why banks adopt such a risky balance sheet in the first place. We use the model to assess quantitatively how perceptions of fundamental risk and of government credit policy in a crisis affect the vulnerability of the financial system ex ante. We also study the effects of macro-prudential policies designed to offset the incentives for risk-taking.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:moneco:v:59:y:2012:i:s:p:s17-s34
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25