Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2009
Volume: 1
Issue: 2
Pages: 168-98

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the revenue-maximizing allocation of several heterogeneous, commonly ranked objects to impatient agents with privately known characteristics who arrive sequentially. There is a deadline after which no more objects can be allocated. We first characterize implementable allocation schemes, and compute the expected revenue for any implementable, deterministic and Markovian allocation policy. The revenue-maximizing policy is obtained by a variational argument which sheds more light on its properties than the usual dynamic programming approach. Finally, we use our main result in order to derive the optimal inventory choice, and explain empirical regularities about pricing in clearance sales. (JEL C61, D21, D82)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:1:y:2009:i:2:p:168-98
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25