Non-Bayesian optimal search and dynamic implementation

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2013
Volume: 118
Issue: 1
Pages: 121-125

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show that a non-Bayesian learning procedure leads to very permissive implementation results concerning the efficient allocation of resources in a dynamic environment where impatient, privately informed agents arrive over time, and where the designer gradually learns about the distribution of agents’ values. This contrasts the rather restrictive results that have been obtained for Bayesian learning in the same environment, and highlights the role of the learning procedure in dynamic mechanism design problems.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:1:p:121-125
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25