Hedge Fund Boards and the Market for Independent Directors

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 2018
Volume: 53
Issue: 5
Pages: 2067-2101

Authors (3)

Clifford, Christopher P. (not in RePEc) Ellis, Jesse A. (not in RePEc) Gerken, William C. (University of Kentucky)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide the first examination of hedge fund boards and their directors. The majority of directorships are held by extremely busy independent directors. These directors are sought by funds because they have more reputational capital at stake, making them independent and credible monitors whose presence can certify fund quality to investors. Busy independent directors are more likely to be hired by high-quality funds, and their departure from the board is associated with investor withdrawals. Moreover, funds with busy independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, abuse discretionary liquidity restrictions, or engage in performance-based risk shifting.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:53:y:2018:i:05:p:2067-2101_00
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25