Interim Rank, Risk Taking, and Performance in Dynamic Tournaments

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2012
Volume: 120
Issue: 4
Pages: 782 - 813

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We empirically study the impact of interim rank on risk taking and performance using data on professionals competing in tournaments for large rewards. As we observe both the intended action and the performance of each participant, we can measure risk taking and performance separately. We present two key findings. First, risk taking exhibits an inverted-U relationship with interim rank. Revealing information on relative performance induces individuals trailing just behind the interim leaders to take greater risks. Second, competitors systematically underperform when ranked closer to the top, despite higher incentives to perform well. Disclosing information on relative ranking hinders interim leaders.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/668502
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25