Costly Persuasion

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2014
Volume: 104
Issue: 5
Pages: 457-62

Authors (2)

Matthew Gentzkow (Stanford University) Emir Kamenica (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study the design of informational environments in settings where generating information is costly. We assume that the cost of a signal is proportional to the expected reduction in uncertainty. We show that Kamenica & Gentzkow's (2011) concavification approach to characterizing optimal signals extends to these settings.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:5:p:457-62
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25