Differentiation‐Induced Switching Costs and Poaching

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2004
Volume: 13
Issue: 4
Pages: 635-655

Authors (2)

Thomas Gehrig (Universität Wien) Rune Stenbacka (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show that the presence of sufficiently significant switching costs, which are increasing in the degree of product differentiation, generates an equilibrium configuration with maximal differentiation within the framework of a Hotelling model with linear transportation costs. The equilibrium with maximal differentiation offers a formalization of the idea that competing firms have noncooperative incentives to establish maximal switching cost barriers. The equilibrium incentives for commitments to high switching costs can be explained with poaching profits, which are increasing in the switching costs. Ex ante competition for market shares in period 1 is unable to eliminate these poaching profits.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:13:y:2004:i:4:p:635-655
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25